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NOT PEACE, BUT A SWORD: NAVY V. EGAN
AND THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL
ABDICATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JASON RATHOD†
ABSTRACT
In the United States’ system of separation of powers, the judiciary
must safeguard the rights of individuals from abuses by the political
branches of government. Yet, when it comes to matters touching
foreign affairs, scholars such as John Yoo and jurists such as Antonin
Scalia argue that the executive branch is entitled to virtually
unreviewable discretion. They point to Navy v. Egan for support.
There, the Court held that an administrative body that hears appeals
from adverse actions against government employees was precluded
from reviewing the merits of security clearance determinations
because the executive branch deserves “super-strong” deference in
foreign affairs. An examination of the disastrous consequences of
Egan crystallizes the constitutional and functional arguments against
“super-strong” deference to the executive—both in foreign affairs
generally and in the security clearance process specifically.
The case has prompted lower courts to deny plaintiffs an
independent forum in which to bring constitutional claims related to
security clearance denials and revocations. Egan’s progeny flouts the
longstanding principle that an individual who suffers a constitutional
injury is entitled to an appropriate remedy. Furthermore, by abdicating
its duty to check executive power in the security clearance context, the
judiciary has fortified deficiencies inherent to executive agency
decisionmaking, namely tunnel vision, path dependency, and
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imperialist tendencies. Abdication has also enabled a systematic
denial of clearances to candidates with foreign connections. Without a
diverse counterterrorism workforce, the United States lacks the
operational proficiency and the legitimacy to wage a successful war
on terrorism.
This Note is the first to call on the judiciary to reclaim the right to
exercise judicial review of the merits of security clearance
determinations. Furthermore, it charts a path for lower courts to
reopen judicial review of the merits of security clearance
determinations, provide injured plaintiffs with a remedy, deter future
racial discrimination, and avert a chilling effect on agency
decisionmakers.

INTRODUCTION
Tucked inside Justice Antonin Scalia’s scathing dissent in the
1
2
landmark case of Boumediene v. Bush lies a passing reference to
3
Department of the Navy v. Egan. Egan holds a special place in the string
citations and law review footnotes of conservative jurists because it
fortified the constitutional and functional pillars propping up the
executive branch’s purported entitlement to “super-strong” deference in
4
foreign affairs. In Egan, the Court held that the Merit Systems
Protection Board, an administrative body created to hear appeals from
adverse actions against government employees, was precluded from
reviewing the substance of security clearance determinations in the
absence of express congressional authorization because the executive
5
branch deserves the “utmost deference” in conducting foreign affairs.
Constitutionally, this executive entitlement allegedly derives from the
6
president’s status as commander-in-chief. Functionally, the executive
branch is said to have structural advantages that make it uniquely

1. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2. Id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, we accord great deference even when the
President acts alone in this area. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U. S. 222, 243 (1984).”).
3. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1100–01 (2008) (describing “super-strong” deference in foreign affairs as the strongest
form of deference courts can invoke).
5. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529–30 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
6. Id. at 527.
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competent to address problems related to foreign affairs. This Note will
demonstrate how, ironically, the destructive consequences of Egan itself
demonstrate that the edifice supporting super-strong deference to
executive power rests on defective foundations.
When the government issues a security clearance, it has determined
8
that an individual is fit to access classified information. The best
estimates suggest that at least 2.5 million positions across executive
9
agencies require security clearances. To obtain a security clearance,
candidates must complete a three-stage process: application,
10
investigation, and adjudication. There have been longstanding
criticisms about the efficiency and quality of the process. In a recent
report on the topic, the House of Representatives Intelligence
11
Committee summarized these criticisms. It found that the process
continues to be plagued by Cold War attitudes and technology; lengthy
delays and substantial backlogs; discrepancies in approach among
agencies and the absence of quality metrics; and an unhealthy focus on
applicants’ foreign family members and associates, which has weeded
out many applicants with Middle Eastern backgrounds, language skills,
12
and expertise. Recent statutes and executive orders have remedied
some of these problems, but overall the process continues to be stuck in
13
“layers and layers of planning.” The stunningly sparse legal scholarship
on judicial review of security clearance determinations consists of two
student works, one calling for the legislative branch to authorize limited
14
15
judicial review and one calling on the executive branch to do the same.
This Note is the first to call on the judiciary to reclaim, on its own, the
right to exercise judicial review of the merits of security clearance

7. Id. at 529; Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 201–02 (2006)
(noting that executive agencies “possess greater expertise over a complex and technical
statute.”).
8. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006).
9. SILVESTRE REYES, PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY
CLEARANCE REFORM—UPGRADING THE GATEWAY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COMMUNITY, H.R. REP. NO. 110-916, at 4 (2008).
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id. passim.
12. Id. at 7–10.
13. Id. at 20.
14. David C. Mayer, Note, Reviewing National Security Clearance Decisions: The Clash
Between Title VII and Bivens Claims, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 786, 813 (2000).
15. William H. Miller, Note, A Position of Trust: Security Clearance Decisions After
September 11, 2001, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 229, 253 (2004).
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determinations and thus provide a necessary check on executive power
in the security clearance process. Contrary to the thinking of jurists like
16
17
Justice Scalia and scholars like John Yoo, this Note will argue that
constitutional and functional considerations weigh heavily against superstrong deference to the executive—both in foreign affairs generally and
in the security clearance process specifically. To properly critique the
drawbacks of super-strong deference and the benefits of judicial review,
this Note will address in depth the problem of racial and national origin
discrimination in the security clearance process.
Part I of this Note lays out the nuts and bolts of the security
clearance process. Part II addresses the constitutional pillar upholding
super-strong deference. Section A explains why super-strong
deference fails to respect the Constitution’s separation-of-powers
scheme by disregarding checks and balances. Section B then
18
demonstrates the “constitutional blasphemy” that Egan and superstrong deference have wrought in lower courts, which has left
plaintiffs who have racial discrimination claims arising from security
clearance revocations without a forum.
Part III addresses the second pillar propping up super-strong
deference: the functional claim that executive agencies are
comparatively more competent than courts to tackle legal issues
19
implicating foreign affairs.
Bureaucratic decisionmaking is
characterized by rigid adherence to standard operating procedures. In
the absence of oversight, which courts are usually in a strong institutional
position to conduct, the resulting policies are frequently dysfunctional.
By abdicating its duty to check agency power in the security clearance
context, the judiciary has fortified a system that makes Americans less
safe. Specifically, the judiciary has enabled a systematic denial of
clearances to candidates with foreign connections, depriving the United
States of the operational skill and the legitimacy to wage a successful war
on terror.
Part IV will show how lower courts can, consistent with existing
Supreme Court precedent, reopen independent judicial review of the
merits of security clearance determinations to adjudicate a plaintiff’s
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18. See Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996, 32 TULSA L.J. 493,
551 (1997) (using these words to characterize Justice Scalia’s dissent in Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592 (1988), which counseled against providing a forum for plaintiffs raising sexual orientation
discrimination as a constitutional violation arising from security clearance revocations).
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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equal protection constitutional claims. The Part then suggests ways in
which courts can make plaintiffs whole. Professor Walter Dellinger
drew a helpful distinction between using the Constitution as a
“shield” and as a “sword” to provide injured plaintiffs with a remedy
20
for constitutional violations. To draw on the Constitution as a shield
is to stop the government from inflicting injury, utilizing equitable or
21
injunctive relief to block impermissible government behavior. To
use it as a sword is to wield it for an affirmative purpose, finding that
the Constitution itself authorizes a cause of action and damage
22
remedy against the government’s officers. This Part argues that
lower courts can and should feel free to employ both remedies when
confronted with colorable equal protection claims arising out of an
adverse security clearance determination. Finally, this Part will shed
light on how to deter future discriminatory agency rulings and avoid a
chilling effect on agency adjudicators.
I. DEMYSTIFYING THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS
When the government issues a security clearance, it has determined
23
that an individual is fit to access classified information. Although
comprehensive statistics are unavailable, the best estimates suggest that
at least 2.5 million positions across executive agencies in the areas of
national defense, homeland security, and foreign policy require security
24
clearances. Classified information is divided into three levels based on
its “sensitivity,” or the level of harm that its disclosure would inflict on
25
national security: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. There are three
26
corresponding levels of security clearances.
To obtain a security clearance, candidates must complete a three27
stage process: application, investigation, and adjudication. The first
stage involves completing an application form, which asks for essential
background information, such as where the candidate has lived, attended
school, and traveled, as well as more personal information related to the

20. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1532 (1972).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006).
24. REYES, supra note 9, at 4.
25. Id. at 4–5.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id.
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candidate’s criminal history, financial situation, and drug or alcohol use.
In the second stage, the investigation, agency investigators gather indepth information about a candidate in a series of standard areas,
through such means as agency database checks and field interviews of a
29
candidate’s neighbors. Even after receiving a clearance, one must
30
undergo periodic reinvestigations.
The third stage, adjudication, entails the relevant agency
reviewing the results of the investigation to render a determination of
31
fitness for a security clearance. The overriding standard is that a
clearance may only be granted when it is “clearly consistent with the
32
interests of national security.” A series of thirteen decision points
are used as baseline criteria to render this judgment, ranging from
“[f]oreign preference” and “[a]llegiance to the United States” to
33
“[f]inancial considerations” and “[s]exual behavior.” Through a
process known as the “whole person concept,” adjudicators weigh
weaknesses in these areas against mitigating factors to make a holistic
34
evaluation of the candidate. For example, dual citizenship is
considered a weakness under the “[f]oreign preference” category, but
can be mitigated if the dual citizenship is due to parents’ citizenship
or birth in a foreign country and if the individual expresses a
35
willingness to renounce foreign citizenship. Doubts about a
36
candidate’s fitness are to be resolved in favor of national security.
28. Id. at 9. The form is known as Standard Form (SF)-86. Id. at 5.
29. COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC.
ALLIANCE, IMPROVING SECURITY WHILE MANAGING RISK: HOW OUR PERSONNEL SECURITY
SYSTEM CAN WORK BETTER, FASTER, AND MORE EFFICIENTLY 1, 21 (2007), available at
http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/INSA-WPaper-Version%202.pdf. Since 2005, the Office of
Personnel Management has led investigations on behalf of the vast majority of agencies,
including the Department of Defense, whose uniformed, civilian, and industry personnel hold
more security clearances than any other agency. Agencies within the Intelligence Community,
whose personnel hold approximately 10 percent of clearances, as well as the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of State, conduct their own investigations. REYES, supra
note 9, at 5–6.
30. REYES, supra note 9, at 5. Those with Top Secret clearances are reinvestigated every
five years, those with Secret clearances every ten years, and those with Confidential clearances
every fifteen years. Id.
31. Id.
32. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 147.2 (2008).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. § 147.5 (listing the criteria and mitigating factors for making determinations related
to the foreign preference category).
36. Id. § 147.2.
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When clearances are denied or revoked, candidates may request an
appeal in which they are entitled to certain procedural safeguards,
including notice as to the decision’s justification, a reasonable
opportunity to respond, outside counsel, and the opportunity to crossexamine individuals who have made adverse statements about the
candidate related to an issue underlying the security clearance
37
determination.
Within these parameters, the precise nature of the adjudicative
38
process varies agency by agency. The Department of Defense’s (DoD)
process for federal government contractors can be considered
39
representative. After an initial adverse decision by the Defense Office
of Hearing and Appeals (DOHA), the candidate is given a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) underlying the decision and may request a DOHA
40
hearing before an administrative judge. The DoD must furnish the
candidate with the evidence that will be presented to substantiate the
41
allegations in the SOR. At the hearing, both sides present their cases to
the judge and the candidate is able to present witnesses and other
documented evidence to rebut the reasons underlying the adverse
42
security clearance determination. The judge then applies the national
43
security standard to reach a decision. Both parties can appeal the
44
decision to a three-judge DOHA appeals board. The board’s standard
45
of review is highly deferential to the hearing. The board is principally
charged with ensuring that the findings of fact were “supported by such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” and
46
that the decision was not “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.” The
standard of review is worded similarly to the Administrative Procedure
37. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. 398 (1959–1963) (promulgated Feb. 20, 1960),
reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006). The Executive Order was issued in the
aftermath of Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), in which the Court held that candidates
were entitled to the “safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination” in the absence of
express authorization stating otherwise from the president or Congress. Id. at 508.
38. Miller, supra note 15, at 235.
39. Id.
40. 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A (2008).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Sheldon I. Cohen, Appeal Board Decisions of the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals: Are They Arbitrary and Capricious? 3–4 (July 2006),
http://www.sheldoncohen.com/publications/DOHA%20Appeal%20Board%20Decisions,%20
Sec.%2002s1.pdf (characterizing the level of review authorized as very limited in scope).
46. 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A.
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Act (APA), which authorizes federal courts of appeals to review
48
agency actions. A striking difference from the APA, however, is that
the DOHA appeals board is not authorized to review for “abuse of
49
50
discretion.” They are also not authorized to review the facts de novo.
II. EGAN AND ITS PROGENY AS CONSTITUTIONAL BLASPHEMY
This Part lays bare the inherent defects of the constitutional pillar
upholding super-strong deference to executive power and stresses the
importance of the judiciary supplying adequate remedies for
constitutional wrongs. Section A will draw on the reasoning of Egan to
show that the failure of super-strong deference to account for checks and
balances represents a corrupt understanding of the Constitution’s
separation of powers. Section B will show that the courts of appeals,
when confronted with plaintiffs raising constitutional claims not
presented by Egan, have relied on the super-strong deference canon to
foreclose review of the merits of adverse security clearance
determinations.
A. Egan and the Constitutional Pillar Supporting Super-Strong
Deference
In Egan, the Court found that the Constitution demands super51
strong deference to the executive on matters touching foreign affairs.

47. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06 (2006).
48. See id. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to
judicial review thereof.”).
49. Compare 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A (allowing review to determine whether the “rulings
or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law”), with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(authorizing the reviewing court to hold unlawful actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
50. Compare 32 C.F.R. pt. 155 app. A (limiting the reviewing court to deferential review of
the Administrative Judge’s findings, review of procedure, and review for “arbitrary [and]
capricious”
rulings),
with
5
U.S.C.
§
706(2)(F)
(establishing
that
“[i]n
making . . . determinations, the court shall review the whole record” and may overturn rulings
based upon factual determinations “subject to trial de novo”).
51. See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (“The authority to protect
[classified] information falls on the President as head of the Executive Branch and as
Commander in Chief.”); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1101 (cataloging various deference
paradigms and placing Egan within its “super-strong” deference paradigm). The most famous
case to articulate super-strong deference to the executive was United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), which held that “congressional legislation . . . within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.” Id. at
320.
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Importantly, the Court had a range of less deferential standards at its
disposal, embodied in cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
52
53
Sawyer, Skidmore v. Swift & Co., and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
54
Resources Defense Council, Inc. Yet the Court chose to invoke superstrong deference, alleging that the standard was derived from the
Constitution’s separation of powers and declaration that the president is
55
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” In
fact, the Court said that the foreign affairs arena is to be considered the
56
“province and responsibility of the Executive.” Moreover, the ability to
classify and control access to intelligence represents a power inherent to
the executive, existing “quite apart from any explicit congressional
57
grant.” The practical implication of this super-strong deference, then, is
that courts should grant “the utmost deference” to the executive in
matters involving foreign affairs, resisting encroachment unless Congress
58
expressly authorizes otherwise. In light of this vision, the Court in Egan
held that the Merit Systems Protection Board, an administrative body
created to hear appeals from adverse actions against government
employees, could not review the substance of security-clearance

52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown “rejected
the . . . vision of unrestrained executive discretion in favor of a normative vision of the policymaking process in which the three branches of government all play integral roles.” HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRANCONTRA AFFAIR 112–13 (1990).
53. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Instead of reflexively granting deference,
the Skidmore standard calls on courts to evaluate an executive agency’s interpretation for the
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.” Id. at 140.
54. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The
Chevron standard dictates that unless the legislative branch has directly addressed the
interpretative issue, then a court must defer to an executive agency’s reasonable interpretation
of a statute that it administers. Id. at 842–43. On the continuum of deference standards, Chevron
can be considered only marginally more scrutinizing than super-strong foreign affairs deference.
See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 783–85 (2004)
(describing how the application of Chevron to agency preemption of state law claims has
enabled agency insensitivity to federalism concerns). For calls to apply Chevron deference in
foreign affairs, see Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV.
649, 725–26 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1227–28 (2007). For a thoughtful critique of applying Chevron in foreign
affairs, see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 1230, 1282–83 (2007).
55. Egan, 484 U.S. at 527 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1).
56. Id. at 529 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–94 (1981)).
57. Id. at 527.
58. Id. at 530 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
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determinations because it was not expressly authorized by statute to do
59
so.
Egan’s pronouncement of sweeping executive power and call for
super-strong deference represents a superficial and flawed view of the
separation of powers. To understand why, one must take a step back to
gain a better grasp of the purpose and architecture of the Constitution.
The Framers divided the government into branches to diffuse power and
60
guard against tyranny. The structure of the document confirms this
61
purpose by embedding a notion of checks and balances. That is, it
generally grants branches the authority to carry out functions that check,
and are checked by, the other branches. For example, a plain reading
shows that the Constitution distributes powers related to foreign affairs
across the branches, rather than vesting those powers exclusively in the
62
executive. The Constitution assigns authority to Congress to regulate
international commerce, form and maintain armed forces, and declare
63
war. Furthermore, courts are vested with the authority to adjudicate all
64
cases and controversies properly brought before them. As Chief Justice
59. Id. at 518.
60. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth of this
country, separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the
Constitution was not only to grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand.”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that “the
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department
consists in giving . . . each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives
to resist encroachments of the others”); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing
Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 316 (1995) (“Functions are separated to avoid amassing
undue governmental power, to protect against governmental tyranny.”).
61. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (“The prohibitions of the Constitution
were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified
by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.”).
62. See Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
805, 806 (1989) (arguing that the Constitution confers foreign affairs powers across the
branches).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Some scholars argue that the Article II Vesting Clause provides
the executive branch with a sweeping grant of foreign affairs power, limited only by the powers
specifically listed elsewhere in the Constitution. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 254 (2001) (“Foreign
affairs powers not assigned elsewhere belong to the President, by virtue of the President’s
executive power; while foreign affairs powers specifically allocated elsewhere are not
presidential powers, in spite of the President’s executive power.”). The text and history of the
Vesting Clause, however, suggest that this interpretation is untenable. Curtis A. Bradley &
Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545,
551–52 (2004).
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 937–44, 975–76 (1988) (arguing
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65

John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison: “The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
66
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” Nowhere does
the Constitution hint that the judiciary’s obligation ends when a matter
67
touches foreign affairs. In fact, if courts were to abdicate their duty, the
separation of powers scheme would be threatened as the courts mutated
into a “partner in the transgressions of the political branches, instead of a
bulwark between them and the individuals who sought the Court’s
68
protection.”
This latter point deserves special emphasis, especially when an
individual is seeking judicial protection from a constitutional violation. It
is widely recognized that a chief function of the judiciary is to supply
69
adequate remedies for constitutional wrongs. In accord with this
that the text of these provisions and the values they represent require federal appellate review
of constitutional issues decided by administrative agency adjudications).
65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
66. Id. at 163. The Court quoted this language favorably in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which it, for the first time,
inferred a legal entitlement to damages against individual federal officers directly under the
Constitution. Id. at 397. Professor Curtis Bradley, who argues for a deferential Chevron canon
in foreign affairs, has characterized the position advocating greater judicial scrutiny in foreign
affairs as the “Marbury perspective.” Bradley, supra note 54, at 665. It bears mentioning that
proponents of super-strong deference also cite John Marshall, referencing a statement he
delivered while serving in the House of Representatives in which he asserted that “[t]he
president is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with
foreign nations.” See, e.g., John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1639, 1679 (2002) (quoting 10 Annals of Congress 613–14) (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1851));
see also id. (pointing to Marshall’s statement as evidence of the executive branch’s purported
plenary power in foreign affairs). There, however, Marshall was addressing a specific dispute
concerning the president’s power to execute U.S. obligations under an extradition treaty and
“not making any claim about unspecified substantive powers.” Bradley & Flaherty, supra note
63, at 549 n.19.
67. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Whatever power the
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”); Charney, supra note 62, at 807 (“[T]he
Constitution does not exclude or limit the courts’ authority in cases or controversies touching on
foreign relations.”).
68. Bandes, supra note 60, at 320; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Concentration of power puts personal liberty in peril of
arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s three-part system is designed to
avoid.”); Charney, supra note 62, at 807 (“Furthermore, matters with foreign relations
implications may involve the legal rights and duties of individuals or the states under federal law
clearly within the courts’ authority. Judicial deference or abstention in such cases may
compromise the authority of the federal courts.”).
69. Bandes, supra note 60, at 294; Fallon, supra note 64, at 956; see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that the
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venerable principle, the Court has applied the constitutional avoidance
70
canon to statutes that appear to strip courts of their jurisdiction to
71
review violations of individuals’ fundamental constitutional rights. That
is, courts make every effort to construe such statutes to avoid the serious
constitutional doubts that would be raised by denying plaintiffs judicial
72
review for colorable constitutional claims. Because the original
constitutional structure should be harmonized with the contemporary
explosion of the administrative state, it is particularly important to
preserve judicial review when executive agencies deprive individuals of
73
their rights. One scholar has gone so far as to say that an agency action
that precludes judicial review of constitutional claims amounts to
74
“constitutional blasphemy.” Precluding review, the argument goes,
would extend a “standing invitation” to agencies to exceed their powers
“independence of the judges is . . . requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humors which . . . the influence of particular
conjunctures[] sometimes disseminate[s] among the people themselves”); Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1486 (1987) (“[T]hat every person should have a
judicial remedy for every legal injury done him was a common provision in the bills of rights of
state constitutions; [and] was invoked by The Federalist No. 43 in a passage whose very
casualness indicated its uncontroversial quality . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
70. “Known colloquially as the avoidance canon, it is most commonly described as
providing that ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such a
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.’” Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2006) (quoting Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
71. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 361 (1974) (permitting a conscientious objector
who had performed alternative service to challenge a federal statute that excluded conscientious
objectors from a veterans’ benefits program even though the statute specified that no court had
the power to review decisions of the Veterans Administration related to the program); Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 258 (1985) (“At this point in
our history I would be startled to see the Court decide that a litigant pressing a bona fide
constitutional claim could be denied access to the independent judgment of a judicial forum.”).
72. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (“[A] ‘serious constitutional
question’ . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim.” (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 681 n.12 (1986))).
73. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 480 (1991) (referencing the
Court’s “well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review
of administrative action”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in
Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 743, 755 (1992) (noting that
judicial review was “part of a constitutional quid pro quo: courts would decline to employ the
nondelegation doctrine to overturn statutes and, in return, courts would preserve the power to
review agency decisions”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and
the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1612–13 (2000) (describing the history
and constitutional importance of preserving judicial review in the administrative law context).
74. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 551.
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and violate constitutional norms because there would be no independent
75
check on their actions.
A principal concern with granting super-strong deference to the
executive on foreign affairs, then, is that it may put the judiciary on a
collision course with the equally strong presumption of judicial review of
76
constitutional claims. If confronted with a choice between the two
presumptions that the Court did not have to face, lower courts may feel
compelled to take the passive course of action out of sheer ease,
77
deferring to political branch power. There is evidence that this is
precisely what happened to Egan’s progeny. When lower courts mixed
Egan’s super-strong deference to the executive with the tangled
relationship among constitutional, statutory, and administrative
remedies relating to racial discrimination, the remarkable result was
complete foreclosure of judicial review for plaintiffs in relation to
security clearance revocations.
B. Egan’s Progeny and the Foreclosure of All Remedies for Racial
Discrimination Claims
Although Egan only barred an administrative board from reviewing
the substance of security clearance determinations involving statutory
claims, its sweeping language about deference to the executive, and
accompanying presumption against judicial review absent congressional
authorization, has compelled lower courts to defer in even constitutional
claims implicating security clearances.
Lower courts have weaved together two separate threads of
precedent to deny a forum to plaintiffs asserting racial discrimination in
78
security clearance revocations. The first thread of cases stands for the

75. Id.
76. Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 689, 730–31 (1990) (describing how the Court employs “a superstrong presumption against
preclusion of constitutional claims”).
77. This behavior is consistent with the judiciary’s historical practice in foreign affairs. See
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 159 (1992) (“[W]hen judges do decide the cases brought to
challenge a foreign policy, it may safely be assumed . . . that they would reach out in an effort to
agree with the story told by the president's experts. In all but the most egregious instances, they
would find a challenged presidential action constitutional and legal.”).
78. Other commentators have described the foreclosure of judicial review as well. See
Mayer, supra note 14, at 788–91 (identifying the fact that courts generally refuse to hear security
clearance decision challenges on Title VII grounds); Miller, supra note 15, at 246 (examining how
Egan and Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976), combine to foreclose
Title VII claims).
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proposition that when Congress has crafted a comprehensive remedial
scheme, plaintiffs are denied access to other statutory and constitutional
remedies. These cases developed as a reaction to Bivens v. Six Unknown
79
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which held that a
plaintiff could seek money damages from individual federal officers for
violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches
80
and seizures. Bivens was groundbreaking because the Court, for the
first time, inferred a legal entitlement to damages against individual
81
officers directly under the Constitution. The Court subsequently
extended Bivens to find causes of action for violations of plaintiffs’ due
82
process and equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. Since
then, however, the Court has retreated by building expansively on two
exceptions to constitutional liability articulated in dicta in Bivens:
1) when there are “special factors counseling hesitation” and 2) when
83
Congress has enunciated an equally effective substitute. In subsequent
cases, the Court has collapsed the two exceptions into one to hold that
the existence of a statutory remedial scheme, even if decidedly inferior to
that which would be provided by a Bivens action, represents a special
84
factor counseling hesitation and precludes constitutional liability.
85
Another case, Brown v. General Services Administration, which failed
to reference Bivens, nevertheless has played an integral role in
precluding Bivens actions, because it held that Title VII of the Civil
86
Rights Act of 1964 supplies the exclusive remedy for racial
87
discrimination in federal employment law.
Lower courts have taken this first thread concerning remedial
preclusion and combined it with a second thread of cases, enshrined in
Egan, which calls on courts to defer to the executive branch on matters

79. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
80. Id. at 397.
81. Id.
82. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979).
83. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97; see also Bandes, supra note 60, at 297–98 (describing the
expansion of the two exceptions).
84. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (ruling that the Civil Service Reform
Act provided the sole remedy for a federal worker claiming First Amendment violations and
defamation after he was demoted allegedly in retaliation for public statements critical of his
agency); see also Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens Constitutional Tort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67
N.C. L. REV. 337, 357–61 (1989) (listing the cases narrowing Bivens’ scope).
85. Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (2006).
87. Brown, 425 U.S. at 835.
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88

pertaining to foreign affairs. Although Egan addressed only an
administrative review board’s authority to review the merits of security
clearances, lower courts have applied its super-strong deference to the
executive to find that there can be no judicial review of the merits of
security clearance determinations absent express congressional
89
authorization. Title VII, which under Brown provides the sole avenue
90
of recourse for racial discrimination in the federal government, has
91
been interpreted to lack such an authorization. Weaving these two
threads together, then, forecloses judicial review of prospective plaintiffs’
claims that require reaching the merits of security clearance
determinations. The circuit courts have been unanimous in following this
92
reasoning.
93
The logic of Egan’s progeny is suspect in light of Webster v. Doe,
decided just four months after Egan. In Webster, a former Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) electronics technician was terminated
pursuant to Section 102(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, which
authorizes the Director of the CIA to terminate the employment of any
94
employee at his discretion. Doe produced statements by his superiors
suggesting that his security clearance was revoked and his job terminated
because the CIA saw his homosexual orientation as posing a threat to
88. See, e.g., Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s Title VII and Bivens claims
related to security clearance revocation).
89. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
90. Brown, 425 U.S. at 828–30.
91. See, e.g., Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to adjudicate the
plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims because there was “no unmistakable expression of
purpose by Congress in Title VII to subject the decision of the Navy to revoke Becerra’s
security clearance to judicial scrutiny”). Alternatively, some courts have declared that judicial
review of the merits of security clearance determinations would run afoul of Title VII’s national
security exception. See, e.g., Cruz-Packer v. Chertoff, 612 F. Supp. 2d 67, 70 (D.D.C. 2009)
(declining to review the plaintiff’s sexual discrimination claims because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g)
sanctions the termination of “an employee if ‘the occupancy of such position . . . is subject to
any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any
security program . . . [and] such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that
requirement.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(g))).
92. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2008); Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999,
1000 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1134, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Tenenbaum v.
Caldera, 45 Fed. App’x 416, 418 (6th Cir. 2002); Becerra, 94 F.3d at 148–49; Weber v. Buhrkuhl,
No. 95-2554, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36114 (8th Cir. Dec. 21, 1995) (per curiam); Perez, 71 F.3d
at 515; Brazil v. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 196–98 (9th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Air Force 844
F.2d 1407, 1409 (10th Cir. 1988); Romero v. Dep’t of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
93. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
94. Id. at 595.
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95

national security. Doe presented statutory and constitutional claims
96
related to the alleged employment discrimination. Because Title VII
prohibits discrimination only on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
97
national origin, and not sexual orientation, Doe fell outside its purview.
The Court held that Doe’s statutory claims under a provision of the
98
APA were precluded by another APA provision that foreclosed
judicial review of “agency action . . . committed to agency discretion by
99
law.” The APA, however, did not preempt Doe’s constitutional
100
claims. The Court declared that there was a strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of constitutional claims that could be overcome
101
only by express congressional authorization denying such review. It
invoked the constitutional avoidance doctrine in support of this position,
noting that a “‘serious constitutional question’ . . . would arise if a federal
statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable
102
constitutional claim.” Importantly, the Court rejected the CIA’s
argument that judicial review would involve inappropriate “‘rummaging
103
around’ in [its] affairs,” finding that lower courts could effectively
balance the plaintiff’s need for access to evidence “against the
extraordinary needs of the CIA for confidentiality and the protection of
104
its methods, sources, and missions.”
The perplexing result of Egan and Webster is that plaintiffs claiming
racial discrimination have no access to judicial review of the merits of
security clearance determinations (because Title VII provides the
exclusive remedy and fails to reach security clearance determinations
under Egan’s progeny). Victims of sexual orientation discrimination,
conversely, can have courts review the merits of colorable constitutional
claims (because sexual orientation falls outside of Title VII and

95. Id.
96. Id. at 596.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (2006).
98. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). Webster charged that the agency action violated the APA
because it was arbitrary and capricious. Webster, 468 U.S. at 596.
99. Webster, 468 U.S. at 597 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
100. Id. at 603 (rejecting petitioner’s claim that unconstitutional policies are unreviewable
under the APA).
101. Id. (“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, its
intent to do so must be clear.” (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974))).
102. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)).
103. Id. at 604 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Webster, 468 U.S. 592 (No. 861294)).
104. Id.
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constitutional claims enjoy their own favorable presumption). In other
words, a statute drafted to afford heightened protection to certain groups
offers them less protection than groups that fall outside of its purview in
106
this context. This discrepancy reflects deep tensions in the reasoning
underpinning the two cases. In other contexts in which Bivens actions
would ordinarily be foreclosed by a statutory scheme, but the specified
alternative has proven inadequate, circuit courts have drawn on Webster
107
to reopen a cause of action directly under the Constitution.
III. EGAN AND JUDICIAL ABDICATION TO INSTITUTIONAL
INCOMPETENCE: THREATENING NATIONAL SECURITY
In a string of cases related to the war on terror, the Court has
refused to find that the executive is constitutionally entitled to super108
109
strong deference in foreign affairs. Indeed, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
110
only Justices Scalia and Thomas signed on to this proposition, whereas

105. Other commentators have described this perplexing outcome as well. See Mayer, supra
note 14, at 788–91; Miller, supra note 15, at 246.
106. Mayer, supra note 14, at 788–91; Miller, supra note 15, at 246.
107. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1035–39 (9th Cir.
2007) (drawing on Webster to hold that Transportation Security Administration security
screeners alleging retaliation in violation of their First Amendment rights were entitled to seek
equitable relief); Czerkies v. Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1440–41 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying on
Webster to hold that a federal employee denied workers’ compensation by an administrative
body was entitled to Article III judicial review of his constitutional due process claim). Part IV
of this Note will explain why courts should build on this precedent to revisit the current
approach to judicial review of security clearances, reopening the option for Bivens actions
against federal officers who violate plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the Fifth
Amendment.
108. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2271–77 (2008) (invalidating as
unconstitutional the statute that stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus
petitions of accused noncitizen enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (declaring military commissions unlawful because they
violated the Geneva Convention); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality
opinion) (holding that an American citizen enemy combatant was entitled to due process
protections); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that federal courts have
jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute to hear challenges to detention raised by detainees
held at Guantanamo Bay).
109. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
110. See id. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our duty to defer to the President’s
understanding of the provision at issue here is only heightened by the fact that he is acting
pursuant to his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and by the fact that the subject
matter of Common Article 3 calls for a judgment about the nature and character of an armed
conflict.” (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936))); see
also Eskridge & Baer, supra note 4, at 1185 (“[O]nly two Justices invoked Curtiss-Wright
deference in Hamdan, where it would seem to have been applicable.”).
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the dissenters in Boumediene left it unstated altogether. The latest trend
has been for those advocating deference to do so on functional
111
grounds, contending that the executive branch has several built-in
112
advantages that make it better fit to handle such matters. Section A
will show that these arguments rest on a set of optimistic and ultimately
misguided assumptions about agency decisionmaking—which, when left
unmonitored, is plagued by tunnel vision, path dependency, and
imperialist tendencies. Although courts should avoid micromanaging
agency tasks, Section B will demonstrate that they are well positioned
institutionally to spot and correct glaring deficiencies inherent to agency
decisionmaking. Finally, Section C demonstrates that judicial abdication
in the context of security clearance revocations threatens the country’s
national security by leaving flaws endemic to agency decisionmaking
unchecked.
As a first order matter, it is imperative to point out that perceived
comparative policy advantages should take a backseat to courts’
constitutional duties to adjudicate matters properly brought before them
113
and safeguard the rights of individuals from the political branches. In
111. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 181 (arguing that deference to agency interpretations
has a strong functional basis); cf. Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Essay, Irrational War and
Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1239 passim
(2006) (pointing out that Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, having lost their constitutional
arguments, have turned to functional arguments to justify deference to the executive in
warmaking powers).
112. Professor H. Jefferson Powell has argued for executive primacy in foreign affairs by
melding the constitutional and functional arguments. H. Jefferson Powell, The President's
Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527,
547–48 (1999). He asserts that the Framers conceived of the executive branch as the best
equipped to address issues arising in the foreign affairs arena and designed the Constitution
accordingly. Id. Nevertheless, contemporary deference proposals must still harmonize these
animating sentiments of the Founders with the unforeseen expansion of the administrative state.
See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 1549, 1551–55 (2009) (reconciling the Founders’ functionalist views of separation of
powers in foreign affairs with contemporary realities); Young, supra note 73, at 1612–13
(describing the history and constitutional importance of preserving judicial review in the
administrative law context). Because the Founders retained checks and balances over a compact
executive in foreign affairs, it is consistent with Powell’s interpretation of their intentions to
allow judicial oversight over the actions of unelected agency officials when they deprive
individuals of equal protection under the law. See discussion supra Part II.A. This argument is
especially true when doing so produces better policy outcomes. See discussion infra Part III.B.
113. Bandes, supra note 60, at 302 (describing the fundamental duties of courts to adjudicate
cases properly brought before them and check the power of the political branches in the
separation-of-powers system). Some scholars go so far as to say that all administrative judicial
actions must be reviewable by Article III courts. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1246–48 (1994) (“Article III requires de novo
review, of both fact and law, of all agency adjudication that is properly classified as ‘judicial’
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particular, when an executive agency’s actions violate an individual’s
constitutional rights, that individual is entitled to an appropriate remedy
114
in an independent judicial forum. Even assuming, arguendo, that
courts are not constitutionally obliged to remedy such violations, the
functional arguments in favor of across-the-board deference to the
executive are misguided.
A. The Institutional Drawbacks of Executive Agencies
115

Supporters of super-strong deference invoke, either implicitly or
116
explicitly, what political scientists term a “rational choice model” that
idealizes executive agencies by imputing supreme rationality and
expertise to their decisionmaking. That is, advocates presume that
agency workers operate by weighing costs and benefits of proposed
117
courses of action and choosing the optimal one. In doing so, they
accumulate vast expertise in their area of practice, which was already a
118
prerequisite for the job. When it comes to foreign affairs specifically,
the view of advocates is that the relevant agencies, unlike courts, are
“solely focused on designing and implementing foreign policy” and, as a
result, possess expertise that makes them better suited to address legal
activity.”). This Note does not make that argument because the Framers’ intent can be honored
by providing an “adequately searching” system of appellate review, rather than a
comprehensive system that would compromise the efficiency of agencies and saddle courts with
an unworkable docket. See Fallon, supra note 64, at 918 (defending an “adequately searching”
system of Article III review of administrative adjudications). A meaningful system of judicial
review would have to include review of an agency’s alleged deprivation of an individual’s
constitutional rights. See id. at 975–76 (stating that it would be “highly disturbing” if Congress
precluded Article III judicial review of constitutional rights violations because of concerns
related to separation of powers and fairness to the litigants). Although it is beyond the scope of
this Note to flesh out the other elements of an “adequately searching” system of Article III
judicial review of agency adjudications, a sound baseline standard can be found in Skidmore,
which calls on courts to evaluate an executive agency’s interpretation for the “thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Mendelson, supra note 54,
at 797–98 (describing the benefits of a Skidmore approach over a Chevron approach in the
context of federal preemption of state law claims).
114. See discussion supra Part II.A.
115. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 201 (treating agencies as unitary, rational actors).
116. Cf. Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815 passim (2007)
(employing a rational choice model to understand the behavior of military lawyers).
117. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 1207 (“The normative question is whether the
executive’s institutional expertise gives it advantages over courts in this setting as it does in the
Chevron setting, and the answer is surely yes.”).
118. Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 202.
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issues that arise in the implementation of their mandates. This
approach proved persuasive in Egan, in which the Court invoked the
comparative institutional advantage of executive agencies to support its
120
holding. Noting that the decision to grant or deny security clearances
involves a multitude of factors that make it “an inexact science at best,”
the Court went on to say that this judgment is best reserved for “those
121
with the necessary expertise in protecting classified information.” The
Court stated further that outside bodies certainly could not conduct risk
122
analyses and assess acceptable margins of error with any confidence.
As such, the judgments of executive agencies could not be second123
guessed.
There is a strong pedigree of support in political science literature
that the rational choice paradigm invoked by supporters of deference is
inappropriate for understanding agency decisionmaking. In their
groundbreaking book Essence of Decision, political scientists Graham
Allison and Philip Zelikow supply an alternative “organizational
processes” model that captures the intricacies of agency decisionmaking
and should be used to interrogate claims concerning the relative
124
institutional competency of courts and agencies. Agencies are formed
to carry out desirable and complex government functions, such as
protecting the environment or analyzing sensitive information about
125
foreign threats. The complexity of the functions requires mass
coordination, which is best executed by “dividing labor, specializing
according to function, and training members of the organization to
126
perform in routine fashion.” Agencies, then, are like the pin factory
analyzed by Adam Smith, where an individual (unfamiliar to the
industry) acting alone could produce perhaps a single pin in a day, while
a small factory of ten workers who divide and specialize their labor could

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
Id. (quoting Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
Id.
Id.
GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 143–96 (2d ed. 1999).
125. Id. at 145.
126. Id.
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127

produce tens of thousands. Thus, agencies, by establishing standard
128
operating procedures, create capabilities otherwise unimaginable.
The nature of agencies, however, also makes them susceptible to
three principal problems: tunnel vision, path dependency, and imperialist
tendencies. Tunnel vision refers to the behavior of bureaucrats who
diligently comply with their specialized standards of procedures without
regard for broader public policy goals or, at times, for the agency’s
129
original mission. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for
instance, has tended to allocate resources toward eliminating even the
most marginal risks associated with an identified hazardous waste site,
instead of using some of those resources to pinpoint and mitigate more
130
significant environmental risks.
Tunnel vision leads to path dependency, or the tendency of agencies
131
to stick to a course of action because it is familiar, rather than optimal.
When a bureaucrat confronts a novel problem or receives new
responsibilities from an external mandate, he or she will not look to
serve the purposes or values of external actors, but will assimilate the
132
new with the letter or logic of old procedures. In the process of
assimilating, the bureaucrats will not canvass a range of options and
133
choose the optimal course of action. Instead, they will stop with the
134
first method that seems good enough. The result is frequently
dysfunctional as “unduly formalized, sluggish, or inappropriate”
135
procedures persist beyond any usefulness.

127. Id. (referencing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 2–3 (Edwin Cannon ed., Random House 1937) (1776)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 156 (“Not norms and values but taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and
classifications are the stuff of which [organizations] are made.” (quoting Paul J. DiMaggio &
Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 1, 15 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991))).
130. Mendelson, supra note 54, at 781 (referencing STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE 11–13 (1993)).
131. ALLISON & ZELLIKOW, supra note 124, at 149.
132. Id. at 149, 156 (“Having chosen their instruments in the circumstances of the past, they
are confined by them as they encounter new circumstances in the future.”).
133. Id. at 155–56 (describing how agencies employ a logic that emphasizes compliance with
procedures, rather than producing favorable consequences).
134. In the parlance of organizational theory, this phenomenon is known as “satisficing.” Id.
at 152, 171; see also HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 118–20 (4th ed. 1997)
(defining the characteristics of the “satisficing administrator”).
135. ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 124, at 170. Professors Allison and Zelikow go on to
note that “[a] program, once undertaken, is not dropped at the point where objective costs outweigh
benefits. Organizational momentum carries it easily beyond the loss point.” Id. at 180.
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Agencies’ imperialist tendencies, or the propensity to seek greater
136
resources and responsibilities unnecessarily, also present problems.
Because “[m]ost organizations define the central goal of ‘health’ as
137
synonymous with ‘autonomy,’” agencies invariably strive for larger
budgets, personnel, and areas of operation, rather than realistically
assess whether they need greater resources or are best equipped to jump
138
into new territory. Consequently, important policy decisionmaking
often becomes bogged down in turf battles among agencies with
overlapping missions. An agency may prevail arbitrarily and at the
139
expense of sound public policy.
B. The Judiciary Is Positioned to Monitor and Remedy Flaws in
Agency Decisionmaking
The point of the foregoing discussion is to question the idealized
understanding of executive agency competence invoked by deference
proponents and, concomitantly, to counsel against an across-the-board
140
deference regime on matters pertaining to foreign affairs. Proponents
of deference properly point out that even if agency decisionmaking is
prone to problems, the appropriate inquiry is whether courts can do a
better job at resolving the relevant legal issues without creating greater
141
costs. There is, in fact, a strong functionalist case that the benefits of
judicial review—allowing a fully independent body with experience
interpreting the law across various fields to check the power of executive
agencies prone to dysfunctional decisionmaking—outweigh the costs—
allowing that body to decide a matter without technical expertise in the
142
field.
136. Id. at 181.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., id. (referencing an incident in World War II when Japanese diplomatic codes
were broken, an interagency battle over control ensued, and the powerful, but ill-equipped,
Naval War Plans Division “won the right to ‘interpret and evaluate’ [the intelligence] . . . [but]
[t]he results for the U.S. government were not good” (footnote omitted)).
140. Although this critique principally applies to the advocates of super-strong deference, it
can also be extended to those who press for other all-encompassing, highly deferential regimes
such as Chevron deference in foreign affairs. For a discussion of Chevron, see supra note 54.
141. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 7, at 202.
142. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 54, at 1262 (“Presidents are nearsighted in a way that
other government actors are not, particularly the judiciary, which tends to be farsighted.”).
Although Professors Jinks and Katyal are critical of deferential regimes in foreign affairs and
stress the strengths of the judiciary, they also speak highly of bureaucracies. Their analysis could
be strengthened by accounting for the deficiencies in agency decisionmaking that occur absent
judicial oversight. As mentioned above, independent judicial review of all agency judicial
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The judiciary has great institutional strength. Courts daily put into
practice the famous John Marshall maxim that “[i]t is emphatically the
143
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” In
saying what the law is, courts serve adjudicative and structural checking
144
functions. First, they serve as an independent forum that neutrally
interprets and applies the law to determine whether the plaintiff before
145
them claiming injury is entitled to relief. Second, they serve as a check
on the political branches of government by seeing that they stay within
146
the confines of their constitutionally granted powers. Typically, judges
are generalists who carry out these functions across a wide array of
147
fields, often implicating highly technical and complex issues. Though
they may not gain expertise in a particular area of law, it is fair to say
that they do accrue expertise in a set of skills that includes “figuring out
statutory purpose and harmonizing applications of statutes with legal
148
and constitutional principles.” Importantly, this skill is the one judges
must draw on to evaluate whether an agency’s actions violate
constitutional rights.
As mentioned, it is true that judges do not possess technical
expertise in foreign affairs, but neither this fact, nor the other reasons
that purportedly make foreign affairs distinct, warrant abdication. As
with complex questions of domestic law, judges can rely on “their
personal experience . . . prior decisions of other judges, scholarly
writings, codifications of the law and the opinions of experts” to draw
149
informed conclusions. Furthermore, just as with any other area of law,
there is no reason to doubt that the adversarial system will produce the
150
necessary factual information to render judgment. As the Court
articulated in Webster, district court judges have sufficient tools at their
151
disposal, such as the option of in camera proceedings, to ensure an
actions would likely prove counterproductive, but an “adequately searching” system of
appellate review would preserve Article III values and produce better policy outcomes. See
supra note 113.
143. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
144. Bandes, supra note 60, at 303.
145. Id. at 303–07.
146. Id. at 311–20.
147. Charney, supra note 62, at 809.
148. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 164 (1994).
149. Charney, supra note 62, at 809.
150. Id. at 810.
151. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988). Section 4 of the Classified Information
Procedures Act authorizes courts to permit the government to submit materials to be inspected
by the court alone. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (2006) (“The court may permit the United States to
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adequate factual record and safeguard the methods, sources, and
152
missions of even the top intelligence agency.
Perhaps most importantly, the nature of executive agencies, in
which job duties are segmented and workers strictly adhere to standard
operating procedures, may not give agencies an appreciable advantage in
area expertise over courts after all. Judge Richard Posner, for example,
has asked proponents of deference (who have, tellingly, failed to answer)
to clarify why “so-called ‘specialists’ who don’t live up to the name (think
only of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which repeatedly in
the cases that come before [federal courts] displays its ignorance of
153
foreign countries) forfeit the deference of reviewing courts?” Political
scientists have argued powerfully that an executive agency’s purported
area of expertise does not warrant a regime of deference, because the
benefit of providing an independent check on its power actually
154
strengthens decisionmaking by promoting deliberation. Judges, who
have a trained eye for seeing how a particular issue fits within a larger
policy and constitutional framework, possess distinct competence to
remedy and call attention to constitutional violations arising from the
tunnel vision, path dependency, and imperialist tendencies that are
endemic to agency decisionmaking. As Judge Posner has said, “[t]he
courts’ institutional position, allowing judges to see particular
applications that legislatures cannot anticipate in advance, puts them in
155
an especially good place to correct absurd applications.”

make a request for [relief from discovery] in the form of a written statement to be inspected by
the court alone.”). Several courts have utilized ex parte, in camera proceedings in cases
implicating classified information. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir.
2002) (affirming the district court’s use of ex parte, in camera proceedings to discern whether
classified information was discoverable).
152. Webster, 468 U.S. at 604.
153. Richard A. Posner, Reply: The Institutional Dimension of Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 952, 964 (2003); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, A Reply to Posner, 101 MICH. L. REV. 972 (2003) (failing to reply to Posner’s central
critique of their work concerning agency expertise).
154. Diehl & Ginsburg, supra note 111, at 1254 (“As a polity moves farther away from
consensus and checks and balances, success rates diminish and other harmful effects ensue.”).
155. Posner, supra note 153, at 968 (quoting CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 182–84 (1996)).
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C. The Security Clearance Process: Immunization from Judicial
Review and the Fortification of Executive Agencies’ Institutional
Incompetence
In Egan and its progeny, judges have insisted that courts defer to
the “institutional expertise” of the executive agencies in making security
156
clearance determinations. With 2.5 million jobs requiring security
clearances, it is true that executive agencies hold the potential to
streamline the security clearance process by maximizing efficiency and
limiting costs. In the absence of oversight, however, executive agencies
have turned the security clearance process into a bureaucratic nightmare,
plagued by dramatic deficiencies in efficiency and quality. The quality
problems in particular are products of agencies’ unchecked tunnel vision,
path dependency, and imperialism. In short, the security clearance
process was developed at the onset of the Cold War and the quirks of
executive agencies have compelled them to cling to the technology,
procedures, and attitudes for guarding classified information in a war
that the United States is no longer fighting. For instance, a failure of
policymakers to account for the tunnel vision of adjudicators has created
a system of perverse incentives, encouraging them to systematically deny
and revoke security clearances of candidates with even the most tenuous
157
foreign connections. The flawed system has significantly impeded the
United States’ capacity (by depriving the federal government of those
with critical foreign language skills and cultural expertise) and legitimacy
(by alienating the communities most likely to come forward with critical
information) to successfully carry out operations in the war on terror.
The institution most capable of spotting and remedying these
deficiencies in the agency adjudicative system—the judiciary—has
abdicated its duty to check agency power and, consequently, has fortified
a system that makes Americans less safe.
1. Efficiency. Although the problems with quality in the security
clearance process will be the focus of this Section, issues concerning
agencies’ efficiency bear mentioning as well. There are two primary
efficiency concerns: backlog and agency reciprocity. First, the security
156. See, e.g., Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 515 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“‘Predictive
judgments of this kind’ properly are left to ‘those with the necessary expertise in protecting [the
sensitive material,]’ rather than in the hands of ‘an outside nonexpert body’ or the equally
nonexpert federal courts.” (quoting Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988))).
157. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-04786 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals June 27,
2003) (finding that a female applicant with a single estranged family member overseas was
vulnerable to coercion and, consequently, unfit for a security clearance).
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clearance process has been plagued by lengthy delays and backlog for
158
at least twenty-five years. The problems persist. A 2004 General
Accounting Office report, for example, found that DoD had a
159
backlog of 270,000 investigations and 90,000 adjudications. On
average, it took the DoD 375 days to process contractors’
160
clearances. These lengthy delays have negative repercussions: the
most qualified candidates often seek employment elsewhere, and
161
critical posts can go unfilled for months on end.
Second, although the government sets forth baseline guidelines for
the security clearance process, quality metrics have traditionally varied
162
greatly agency by agency. As a result, many agencies are reluctant to
bring on a federal employee or contractor with a clearance from another
agency without first undergoing their own extensive investigation and
163
adjudication. The lack of reciprocity poses significant barriers in a
world where protecting against terrorist threats requires sharing
information and connecting the dots among agencies.
The political branches appear committed to improving the security
clearance system’s efficiency, even if the results of reform have been
somewhat mixed. In 2004, Congress passed and the president signed the
164
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), which
contained a slew of provisions designed to centralize and streamline the
165
process. Since IRTPA’s enactment, the president has also issued two
166
executive orders fleshing out guidelines to further reform structure and
advance the security clearance process. The reforms have improved
167
timeliness, though a lack of reciprocity persists. The latter problem
results mostly from agencies’ imperialist tendencies. According to the
ranking member of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence
Management, Darrell Issa, “[t]he problems with security clearance
reform do not seem to be ones of money or even ideas. The real issues

158. REYES, supra note 9, at 7.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, at 1, 8.
162. REYES, supra note 9, at 8.
163. Id.
164. Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638.
165. 50 U.S.C. § 435b (2006).
166. Exec. Order No. 13,381, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,953 (June 27, 2005); Exec. Order No. 13,467,
73 Fed. Reg. 38,103 (June 30, 2008).
167. REYES, supra note 9, at 3.
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seem to be stubbornness and a refusal to embrace system-wide efficiency
168
over agencies’ proprietary desire to control the clearance process.”
2. Quality. “If you didn’t come over on the Mayflower, you can’t
169
get a clearance.” Notably, none of the recent reforms take aim at
the deep-seated quality problems in the security clearance process.
170
Indeed, the Democratic chair
and the Republican ranking
171
member of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Management,
172
as well as the former Director of National Intelligence, have all
criticized the status quo for needlessly excluding individuals from
critical communities and have stated a desire for a more diverse
federal workforce. But none of them has introduced meaningful
reform. Perhaps these and other political leaders are reluctant to
tinker with a process they do not fully grasp. Yet, there is mounting
evidence that agencies’ tendency toward path dependency and tunnel
vision impedes the quality of the national security clearance process.
First, there is a pronounced problem of path dependency,
particularly in the investigative and adjudicative stages. The system was
hatched at the onset of the Cold War and remains tethered to that
173
bygone era. Perhaps field investigations made sense in the 1940s when
neighborhoods were more closely knit and investigators could credibly
glean intimate details bearing on a candidate’s credibility from
174
neighbors. In today’s increasingly mobile society, field investigations
168. Id. at 20.
169. Stan Crock, If You Didn’t Come over on the Mayflower, You Can’t Get a Clearance, BUS.
WK., Feb. 2, 2004, at 54, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
04_05/b3868083.htm.
170. See Security Clearance Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence
Community Management of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 1 (2008)
(statement of Rep. Eshoo, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Intelligence Community Management)
(“[W]e tended to exclude people who had relatives overseas. This meant that our Intelligence
Community was not very diverse. Today we need people who can blend this all over the
world.”).
171. See id. at 3 (statement of Rep. Issa) (“[W]e should not assume that individuals’
allegiances are suspect simply because they have friends or family in the Middle East.”).
172. See Walter Pincus, Incoming Intelligence Chief Plans to Ease Hiring of Arabs, WASH.
POST, Feb. 7, 2007, at A15 (citing then-Navy Vice Admiral John M. McConnell’s commitment
to discard outdated security clearance procedures and hire more first-generation ArabAmericans).
173. See COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, at 11 (“Thirteen of
the fourteen ‘decision points’ currently used to evaluate if a candidate is eligible for a security
clearance are vestiges of the system created in the 1940s. Since then, society, our ways of
communicating, and perhaps the reasons why individuals spy have changed.”).
174. Id.
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involving subjective or outmoded questions (such as “Does the applicant
175
drink a lot?” or “[D]oes the applicant live within his means?”) are
176
likely to yield either blank stares or incredibly varied responses.
Neither is particularly useful for determining fitness to access classified
information.
In the adjudication stage, thirteen out of the fourteen decision
points used today to evaluate a candidate’s fitness are remnants of the
177
original Cold War system. There was no hard evidence at the time that
these decision points represented the optimal criteria for assessing a
candidate’s suitability to access sensitive information. Today, there
would seem to be even less reason to cling to the criteria given that
“society, our ways of communicating, and perhaps even the reasons why
178
individuals spy have changed.” Adjudicators have applied three of
these decision points, “allegiance to the United States,” “foreign
179
preference,” and “foreign influence,” to deny or revoke en masse
180
security clearances for candidates with foreign connections. There are
unquestionable justifications underpinning these decision points, but
they can nevertheless be used merely as a pretext for discrimination. The
allegiance criterion ensures that a candidate charged with safeguarding a
nation’s most important secrets has unwavering loyalty to the United
181
States. It can, however, be invoked to disqualify an individual who has
tenuous associations with individuals or groups who have purportedly
182
expressed hostility to the United States. The foreign influence criterion
ensures that a close family member or strong financial interest overseas
cannot be leveraged as pressure to reveal sensitive information to a
183
hostile entity. It can, however, be invoked to disqualify a candidate
solely because family members live abroad, even when they are
estranged and the candidate exhibits unwavering fidelity to the United

175. Id. at 5, 11.
176. See id. at 11 (referencing the questions from the Cold War era that are still used today).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 14.
179. 32 C.F.R. § 147.2 (2008).
180. For a discussion of “tunnel vision,” see infra text accompanying notes 185–87.
181. 32 C.F.R. § 147.3.
182. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2008) (refusing to reach the merits of a
Department of Transportation security clearance adjudication that revoked plaintiff’s security
clearance because of undefined ties to associates in Egypt).
183. 32 C.F.R. § 147.4.
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States such that there is no reason to believe that he or she would
184
compromise national security out of personal interest.
Another key quality impediment is tunnel vision, which is the
primary explanation for adjudicators’ systematic denial or revocation of
security clearances for those with foreign ties. Recall that adjudication is
the final stage of the clearance process, so an adjudicator, particularly an
appeals adjudicator, is the last line of defense against a spy or otherwise
185
unfit candidate handling sensitive information. If the adjudicator signs
off on the clearance request of a candidate who eventually engages in
traitorous activity, then superiors can readily pin blame on that
adjudicator with damaging consequences sure to follow. Under this
ominous cloud, adjudicators, in all probability, view their duty as rigidly
policing the decision points to safeguard against even marginal risks. In
the wake of the traumatizing terrorist attacks carried out on
September 11, 2001, one would expect their eye for suspect information
to have become sharper, resulting in a greater rate of denial. For
example, when a concern is raised about a candidate under the
allegiance to the United States, foreign preference, and foreign influence
186
criteria, an adjudicator would presumably have a strong, perhaps
irrebuttable, institutional bias against granting the candidate a clearance.
Importantly, per the “organizational processes” model, one would not
expect an adjudicator to consider that broader agency goals, such as
recruiting from critical communities, may be impeded by rigid
application of the decision points—especially when they are not
incorporated into the rules and standards she is to apply, agency officials
never tell her to consider them, and there is no judicial review of her
187
decision. Moreover, even if the adjudicator were advised to consider
such goals, her personal interest would be to continue rigid policing. A
spy can be traced directly back to her, whereas the failure to achieve a
broader agency objective has more diffuse culpability.
Empirical evidence confirms that these perverse incentives bear out
their expected consequences. As a caveat, there are obstacles to
collecting reliable data. No agency publishes statistics related to its
security clearance decisions and only one appeals board, DOHA,
188
publishes its decisions. DOHA addresses contractors’ employees and

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra note 157.
For a discussion of the third stage of the application process, see supra Part I.
32 C.F.R. § 147.2.
For a discussion of the drawbacks of executive agencies, see supra Part III.A.
Cohen, supra note 45, at 8 n.25.
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not all DoD cases. Nevertheless, its evidence demonstrates that appeals
judges: 1) have a strong institutional bias against granting clearances in
cases before them and 2) systematically deny or revoke the security
clearances of candidates with foreign connections (that is, cases in which
foreign influence or foreign preference challenges are raised against
them). One study analyzed the 898 DOHA appeals decided between
189
January 2000 and May 2006. It found that in cases in which the trial
court had denied a clearance, candidates secured a reversal on appeal a
mere 0.83 percent of the time, whereas the DoD prevailed in a stunning
190
73.9 percent of cases it appealed. The disparity was even starker in
foreign influence and foreign preference cases. In the 144 cases in which
the trial court denied a clearance on the basis of either foreign influence
191
or preference, the appeals board affirmed every time. In the forty-nine
cases implicating the same issues in which the trial court granted a
clearance and the DoD appealed, however, the appeals board affirmed
192
only four decisions and reversed forty-five. Thus, the grim reality is
that of the 193 appeals involving a candidate with a foreign relative or
connection, the appeals board allowed a clearance to be granted in only
193
four cases, each with atypical circumstances.
Given the appeals board’s limited scope of review, these disparate
results simply cannot be reconciled with sound legal principles. For
example, the forty-five reversals of decisions for the candidate on foreign
influence or preference issues were originally decided by thirty-one
194
different trial judges. As the author of the study, Sheldon Cohen,
notes, the appeals board’s reasoning calls on observers to reach the
improbable conclusion that these thirty-one different judges, who
presumably have a grasp of the law and routinely apply it to varied fact
patterns, all weighed the evidence in a manner that was “arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law” in the 92 percent of cases in which they
granted clearances, and yet competently weighed the evidence in 100
percent of the foreign influence and foreign preference case in which
195
they denied clearances. A more plausible interpretation is that appeals
judges are following their perverse incentives and putting a legal gloss on
an unstated policy of denying clearances to those with foreign ties.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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Cohen indeed finds support for this proposition by cataloging the
contorted legal reasoning appeals judges invoke to depart from
precedent and deny clearances in many of the foreign influence and
foreign preference cases. For example, to reverse a favorable
determination, an appeals judge frequently will say that the trial judge
used “piecemeal analysis” that amounted to being arbitrary or
196
capricious. In one case, the trial judge granted a clearance to a
197
candidate from Taiwan. The appeals board found that the correct legal
standard was used, but because the trial judge mentioned that Taiwan
was a friendly country to the United States without mentioning that
sometimes friendly countries also engage in spying, the analysis was
198
“piecemeal” and therefore arbitrary and capricious. Another device
the appeals board employs is pointing to evidence in the record that the
trial judge failed to consider—no matter how trivial—and then reversing
199
the decision. In one case, the trial judge granted a clearance to a
candidate from Iran, taking into consideration her country of origin and
the fact that she “decided to leave Iran in order to pursue a life free of
200
the dictatorship imposed by the ruling fundamentalist regime.” The
appeals board reversed, finding that the judge failed to consider the
“significant record evidence” that Iran is hostile to the United States,
201
thereby rendering the decision an “arbitrary and capricious action.”
Importantly, however, Cohen points out that when the appeals board
concurs with the outcome of a trial decision in which potentially key
evidence is omitted, the appeals board will affirm, rationalizing that the
202
omission was merely “harmless error.” The most frequently used
device to deny a clearance to a candidate with family members living
203
overseas is to require an impossible burden of proof. The primary

196. Id. at 28.
197. Id. (referencing ISCR Case No. 02-22461 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals Oct.
27, 2005)).
198. Id. at 28–29 (referencing ISCR Case No. 02-22461).
199. See id. at 23–24 (citing the trivial failures of judges).
200. Id. at 24 (quoting ISCR Case No. 02-00318 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals
Feb. 25, 2004)).
201. Id. at 26 (quoting ISCR Case No. 02-00318). Cohen appropriately notes that the
appeals board’s reasoning presumes that the trial judge had not read a newspaper or an appeals
board opinion concerning Iran in the last thirty years. Id.
202. Id. at 25 (referencing ISCR Case No. 02-02892 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals
June 28, 2004) (ruling that the trial judge’s failure to consider that the candidate’s contacts with
his Saudi Arabian family were sporadic was harmless error)).
203. Id. at 18 (“In case after case every variety of argument by an applicant has been
rejected.”).
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concern with family abroad is that a foreign agent could abduct and use
204
them as leverage to coax classified information. DOHA has developed
a rule that candidates prove the impossible and show not only that the
family members had never been coerced by a foreign government in the
205
past but that they would never be coerced in the future. Even if
candidates can demonstrate that they are estranged from their overseas
206
relatives or affirm that they are sufficiently loyal to the United States
207
so as not to compromise national security out of self-interest, they will
still lose.
The problems of path dependency and tunnel vision are not easily
208
correctable with internal agency reforms. First, path dependency, by its
very definition, dictates that agencies hew to suboptimal courses of
action merely because they are familiar. Second, it is difficult to imagine
an internal restructuring that could escape the perverse incentives
created by tunnel vision. As long as an agency official is the last to sign
off on a security clearance, then that official’s incentive will be to overpolice the guiding criteria because a spy can be traced directly back to
her, whereas the blame for failing to realize an agency objective is shared
across the agency. The best way, then, to spur change and alter the
incentive structure is for a judge, insulated from the agency’s culture, to
look over the agency’s shoulder and correct its practices when they are
inconsistent with the Constitution.
3. The Adverse Impact of Unchecked Agencies on the United
States’ National Security. The harms inflicted on national security by
the status quo cannot be overstated. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission
Report described a dire need to attract first- and second-generation
Americans, particularly those with Arabic language skills and Middle

204. Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information, 32 C.F.R. § 147.4 (2008) (“Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial
interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an
individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.”).
205. Cohen, supra note 45, at 18.
206. See supra note 157.
207. See ISCR Case No. 05-10108 (Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals June 22, 2006)
(denying a security clearance to an applicant because of family members living overseas even
though the adjudicator agreed he was “a loyal and trustworthy citizen of the U.S. who served in
the Army with distinction”).
208. For a discussion of the drawbacks of executive agencies, see supra Part III.A.
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209

Eastern cultural competency. At the time, the report pinned much
of the blame on the cumbersome and primitive security clearance
210
Today, Lee Hamilton, the vice chairman of the
process.
commission, laments the same lack of representation and the same
obstacles, writing that “the better you know a critical language,
culture, or people, the less likely you are to get a security
211
clearance.”
The systematic exclusion of those with the relevant expertise
impedes our operations and undercuts our legitimacy in the war on
terror. It harms the country’s operations in three fundamental ways.
First, agencies lack the diversity of agents necessary to gather human
212
intelligence on terrorist organizations. Credibly penetrating and
gathering intelligence on a pan-ethnic terrorist network like Al-Qaeda
213
requires having a pan-ethnic workforce. Second, agencies lack the
linguists to translate reams of intelligence that remain unparsed in
214
languages like Arabic or Urdu. In 2006, for example, the Iraq Study
Group reported that of the one thousand people working in the U.S.
Embassy in Iraq, only thirty-three spoke Arabic and only six spoke it
215
fluently. Third, the status quo perpetuates a law enforcement culture
that privileges establishing guilt by association over the more difficult
and important task of uncovering genuine terrorist threats to the

209. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 91–92 (2004), available at http://www.
9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (enumerating the problems associated with lack of
diversity in the intelligence community).
210. See id. at 92 (“Security concerns also increased the difficulty of recruiting officers
qualified for counterterrorism. . . . Many who had traveled much outside the United States
could expect a very long wait for initial clearance. Anyone who was foreign-born or had
numerous relatives abroad was well-advised not even to apply.”).
211. Lee Hamilton, Intelligence Challenges Await Obama, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 29,
2008, at A12.
212. See Frank Cilluffo, How Can the U.S. Improve Its Human Intelligence?, WASH. TIMES,
July 6, 2008, at M11 (detailing how the lack of diversity and foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community prevents the United States from gathering human intelligence on AlQaeda).
213. Id.
214. See Harry Levins, Supply of Arabic Students Falls Far Short of America’s Demand, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2004, at A1 (attributing to Heritage Foundation expert James
Carafano the observation that intelligence agencies are “awash in untranslated gleanings of
intelligence in Arabic”).
215. JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 92 (2006) (“All of our
efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of language and
cultural understanding.”).
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216

homeland. In the security clearance process, for example, expending
scarce resources to ferret out tenuous associations and painstakingly
policing Cold War decision points makes little sense, especially
considering that the notorious spies have been those who began with
clean records and good intentions but became disaffected and betrayed
217
their country.
In addition to hurting national security in an operational sense, the
current approach imputes disloyalty and breeds mistrust within
218
communities that could provide needed intelligence. As stated, the
current process needlessly excludes those with foreign connections in
general and those with Middle Eastern backgrounds, language skills, and
expertise in particular. Such exclusion undercuts the legitimacy of law
enforcement efforts in relevant communities. As Professor David Cole
has said,
One critical way to break down barriers is to employ members of
the targeted community as law enforcement personnel. . . . [T]he
presence in the ranks of law enforcement of individuals from
targeted communities can open pathways of communication and

216. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV., 953, 986 (2002) (“If all one needs to
prove is association, one need not do the difficult work of determining whether in fact the
individuals are engaged in any criminal or terrorist activity.”).
217. COUNCIL ON SEC. & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, supra note 29, at 9.
218. An international legitimacy argument can be made as well. In a conventional war, the
road to victory is paved by “kill[ing] or captur[ing] the enemy.” Ganesh Sitaraman,
Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2009).
In the war on terror, this “kill-capture” strategy is subordinated to a “win-the-population”
strategy, which aims to win the hearts and minds of targeted populations and marginalize those
who seek to destabilize legitimate political orders. See id. at 1765–70 (discussing the shift in the
United States’ war on terror strategy from the “kill-capture” model to the “win-the-population”
model). The domestic miscarriage of justice against those from critical communities can
arguably tarnish the United States’ image as a preserver of human rights norms and the rule of
law, handicapping the country’s ability to attract support from relevant international
populations. See Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 24 (2002) (noting that the United States’ “soft power,” or the
ability to positively influence the behavior of other countries through the force of its values, is
“derived from the appeal of ideas such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and
individual freedom”). A similar phenomenon occurred in the early years of the Cold War. Then,
the United States’ efforts to win hearts and minds in Asia, Africa, and South America met with
stiff resistance as the Soviet Union tarnished the United States’ reputation by circulating court
cases illustrating Jim Crow justice. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12 (2000).
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trust, as well as help law enforcement understand those
219
communities’ needs and problems.

Just as the presence of individuals from targeted communities can
foster trust, however, their absence or mistreatment can breed
220
resentment. Consider the case of Moniem El-Ganayni, a naturalized
citizen from Egypt, prison imam and Muslim community leader, and
221
former nuclear scientist for the U.S. Department of Energy. The
Middle Eastern and Muslim communities in Pittsburgh, where ElGanayni lived, probably respected the government for having El222
Ganayni work for it. There must have been shockwaves throughout
223
the same communities when federal agents questioned his allegiance,
summarily revoked his security clearance, terminated him, and denied
224
him the right to even an agency appeal. “I will not live in this country
225
as a second-class citizen,” he said after being denied an agency appeal.
The image of El-Ganayni and his wife losing the case in district court and

219. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 191 (2003).
220. See Cole, supra note 216, at 986–87 (“If the community . . . view[s] law enforcement
officials as unjustly suspecting them for their ethnic, political, or religious identity, an
adversarial relationship is likely to arise making law enforcement more difficult. . . . Witnesses
are less likely to come forward, to work with police and prosecutors, or to testify in court.”).
221. See Sally Kalson, Physicist Loses U.S. Clearance, Job and Right to Fight Back,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 1, 2008, at A1 (narrating El-Ganayni’s story).
222. El-Ganayni, after all, helped found the local Islamic Center and served as its
“president, board member, committee chairman, teacher, prayer leader, prison outreach worker
and relief-provider for people in need.” Sally Kalson, Another Imam in Legal Limbo:
Physicist/Cleric Fights to Get Back Job, Clearance, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 3, 2008,
at A1. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that members of the local Muslim community held the
government in higher regard for employing one of its most visible leaders.
223. See id. Farooq Husseini, director of interfaith relations at the Islamic Center, called
government confrontations with El-Ganayni and another local imam “astonishing,” adding that
“[t]hese are good men, very kind, very loyal. . . . If this can happen to them, it can happen to
anybody.” Id.
224. See El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 2:08-cv-881, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88243,
at *2–9 (W.D. Pa., Oct. 31, 2008) (describing the facts surrounding the case). The Department of
Energy denied El-Ganayni an agency appeal pursuant to Executive Order 12,968 § 5.2(d). See
El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 2:08-cv-881, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96220, at *2–3
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2008) (discussing the Department of Energy’s determination that the agency
appeal process would not be made available to El-Ganayni). Executive Order 12,698 § 5.2(d)
provides that a “particular procedure” related to the agency appeals process can be denied
when the head of an agency or principal deputy personally certifies that allowing the procedure
would “damage[] the national security interests of the United States by revealing classified
information.” Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006).
225. Kalson, supra note 221.
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moving from Pittsburgh to Egypt after twenty-eight years in the United
226
States likely will not fade easily.
IV. REMEDIES
The foregoing Parts have stressed the importance of preserving
judicial review of security clearance determinations to vindicate
constitutional injuries and provide the government with a diverse
workforce capable of winning the war on terror. These concerns
demand that courts discard their reliance on super-strong deference
to the executive in foreign affairs, which denies a forum to plaintiffs
raising constitutional claims of discrimination in relation to security
clearance denials and revocations. Section A maps out how lower
courts can, consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent, reopen
independent judicial review of the merits of security clearance
determinations to adjudicate a plaintiff’s equal protection constitutional
claims. Section B suggests ways in which courts can then make these
plaintiffs whole and deter future discriminatory agency rulings while
avoiding a chilling effect on agency adjudicators.
A. A Roadmap for Courts of Appeals to Adjudicate the Merits of
Security Clearance Determinations
To escape the current trap of forum foreclosure, circuit courts
can draw on the constitutional avoidance doctrine embedded in
227
Webster. Indeed, lower courts in other contexts have relied on
Webster to reopen judicial review and the option for Bivens claims
228
when all other options have been foreclosed. Circuit courts would
be on especially solid ground doing so here because Webster expressly
permitted courts to reach the merits of security clearance
determinations in relation to sexual orientation discrimination

226. See Sally Kalson, Muslim Physicist Leaves U.S. After Losing Security Clearance,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 28, 2008, at A1 (describing El-Ganayni’s departure and
noting that he was “a respected member of the Muslim community, a founder of the Islamic
Center of Pittsburgh who gave charity freely and moonlighted as a prison chaplain”).
227. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (invoking the constitutional avoidance
canon to permit district courts to adjudicate a plaintiff’s constitutional claim arising from an
adverse security clearance determination). For a description of the application of the
constitutional avoidance canon when courts have seemingly been stripped of jurisdiction to review
violations of individuals’ fundamental constitutional rights, see supra notes 68–76.
228. See supra note 107.
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229

claims. It would be supremely puzzling for the Court to sanction
such review in the case of homosexuals, but deny it in the case of
racial minorities and other groups singled out by Congress for
heightened protection. To reopen judicial review here, lower courts
can find that Title VII does not preempt equal protection claims
because of the serious constitutional doubts that would be raised by
230
denying plaintiffs judicial review for colorable constitutional claims.
Once the merits are reached, a court would need to conduct an
appropriate equal protection analysis to determine if the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Racial and national origin classifications trigger
231
strict scrutiny review. If evidence can be presented that the
administrative adjudicators employed facially discriminatory rules,
such as in the DOHA decisions, then the government would need to
demonstrate that the discrimination was for a compelling purpose and
that the least discriminatory means were employed to achieve the
232
purpose. Courts would likely find such rules as the irrebuttable
presumption of proving that a foreign relative will never be coerced
by a foreign government to be vastly overinclusive and therefore
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis.
If the lower courts do not want to altogether discard deference
doctrines on matters touching foreign affairs, they can invoke an
233
important distinction drawn in Hampton v. Wong. There, the Court
distinguished between express mandates made in the foreign affairs
arena by the president or Congress and those made by administrative
234
agencies. The former receive only rational basis review, whereas the
235
latter receive strict scrutiny. In Hampton, per this standard, the
Court invalidated a Civil Service Commission internal regulation that
required most civil service jobs to be filled by citizens, even though

229. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 603 (“Nothing in § 102(c) persuades us that Congress meant to
preclude consideration of colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the
Director [of the CIA] pursuant to that section . . . .”).
230. For a description of how construction of Title VII contributes to forum foreclosure for
plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination in the security clearance process, see supra Part II.B.
231. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (invalidating a school board’s program permitting preferential treatment for blacks
against layoffs).
232. See id. at 280–82 (laying out this rule governing contemporary equal protection
jurisprudence).
233. Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
234. See id. at 105 (observing that presidential or congressional enactments are entitled to a
presumption of validity that executive agencies do not receive).
235. Id.
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the agency invoked foreign affairs interests such as providing an
236
incentive for aliens to naturalize. Had the law been made through
executive order or statute, however, it would have been considered
237
constitutional.
Although tracking Hampton would be less than ideal from the
theoretical perspective of a court whose imperative is to safeguard
individual rights from political branch abuse, it nevertheless would
likely lead to the same outcome as a blanket strict scrutiny rule. After
all, it would trigger strict scrutiny of the agency regulation, which
accordingly would be declared unconstitutional. Once so declared, it
would seem highly unlikely for the political branches to expressly
require that adjudicators employ the discriminatory standards, such
as those pervading DOHA decisions.
B. Making Plaintiffs Whole, Deterring Future Discrimination, and
Avoiding a Chilling Effect
After declaring the discriminatory rule unconstitutional, lower
courts would have to determine the remedy necessary to make the
plaintiff before them whole. Professor Walter Dellinger provided a
useful distinction between using the Constitution as a “shield” and as
238
a “sword” to fashion remedies for constitutional violations. To use it
as a shield is to block the government from causing injury, using
equitable or injunctive relief to neutralize impermissible government
239
behavior. To use it as a sword, which the Court explicitly did for the
first time in Bivens, is to employ it for an affirmative purpose, finding
240
a cause of action directly under the Constitution. Working within
the current web of Supreme Court precedent, lower courts can and
should feel free to employ both remedies when confronted with
colorable equal protection claims arising out of an adverse security
clearance determination.
236. See id. at 116 (“[A]ssuming without deciding that the national interests identified by the
petitioners would adequately support an explicit determination by Congress or the President to
exclude all noncitizens from the federal service, we conclude that those interests cannot provide
an acceptable rationalization for such a determination . . . .”).
237. See id. at 105 (“We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the
President had expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the
national interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized . . . .”).
238. Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1532.
239. See id. (describing his theory of the use of the Constitution as a shield against
government action).
240. See id. at 1532–33 (describing his theory of the use of the Constitution as a sword in
Bivens).
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In most instances, a shield remedy of remanding the case back to
the agency with instructions to apply nondiscriminatory standards
would suffice. It is possible to envision, however, an instance when an
equitable remedy would be insufficient. Say, for example, that a
Kurdish linguist translating intelligence from Northern Iraq had her
security clearance revoked in February 2009 solely because of her
national origin and is then terminated. In the time between her
termination and trial two years later, a phased withdrawal from Iraq
commenced and intelligence operations in Northern Iraq were scaled
back, so that her old position no longer exists. As a result, a shield
remedy would not suffice for the Kurdish linguist because there is no
position for the agency to return her to. Instead, it would be
241
“damages or nothing” as it was for the plaintiff in Bivens. The case
242
would be analogous to Davis v. Passman, in which the Court held
that damages were available as a remedy to a congressman’s female
employee because in the time between commencing her employment
discrimination claim and receiving a ruling, the Congressman lost his
243
seat and therefore she could not be reinstated to her old position.
Under a Bivens action, the federal officers responsible for the
244
constitutional violation are held personally liable for causing injury.
In this case, then, the adjudicators revoking her clearance would be
held liable. Generally, however, executive officials are entitled to
qualified immunity and protected from liability for civil damages
245
when performing discretionary functions.
Thus, it would be
exceedingly difficult to recover from the federal officers here.
Moreover, there is the possibility that forcing the agency adjudicators
to personally pay could produce a chilling effect in which they avoid
issuing adverse security clearance determinations out of fear of losing
246
their salary. Alternatively, then, the plaintiff could take the cause of
action arising directly under the Constitution and pair it with a
241. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (inferring a damages remedy directly under the Constitution
because for the plaintiff “it [was] damages or nothing”).
242. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
243. See id. at 245, 248 (holding that a Bivens-based damages remedy would be available to
the plaintiff and remanding for consideration on the merits).
244. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (determining that the defendants could be held personally
liable).
245. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (“Qualified immunity ‘represents
the norm’ for executive officers . . . .” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986))).
246. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1533 (noting the possibility that Bivens might induce a
chilling effect).
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statutory back-pay remedy. The cause of action would track Bivens,
but the remedy, rather than coming from the pockets of adjudicators,
would come from the federal government vis-à-vis the Back Pay Act,
which ensures recompense for “unjustified or unwarranted personnel
action [that] has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part
248
of the pay.” This approach would overcome qualified immunity
defenses and avoid punishing adjudicators financially, which could
potentially have a chilling effect.
Reopening a Bivens cause of action could also reshape agency
norms. By making pronouncements on the rule of law and especially
the Constitution, the judiciary wields influence through social norms.
As Professor Richard Primus has said, “[J]udicial articulation of a
system of constitutional values in which racial discrimination is
reprehensible might shape the normative atmosphere in which
government officials act, making them less likely to want to
249
discriminate in the first place.” Thus, the prospect of censure by
Article III judges could compel agency adjudicators to examine the
motives underlying their determinations, to recalibrate those motives
to accord with the Constitution, and to provide candidates from
250
critical communities with fairer hearings.
Even if individual
adjudicators’ attitudes fail to change, judicial pronouncement of
constitutional values could alert an adjudicator’s coworkers and
superiors that a fundamental change in culture is needed, fostering
agency attitudes and norms likely to serve as a deterrent for
discriminatory actions.
CONCLUSION
Writing in the wake of Bivens nearly forty years ago, Professor
Walter Dellinger praised the way that the Court had finally used the
Constitution as a sword, piercing sovereign immunity to fashion

247. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice Working Group, Judicial Review of Claims of Discrimination
in Security Clearance Determinations n.12 (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/justice.html#12 (describing the position of the Civil Rights
Division that this pairing is perfectly plausible).
248. Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (2006).
249. Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 1016 (2004).
250. See id. at 1016 n.159 (referring to the theory that individuals internalize behavioral
incentives that are provided by the law).
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appropriate remedies for the violation of individual rights. In the
intervening years, the judiciary has all too often retreated, abdicating
its duty to safeguard civil liberties, particularly when the executive
252
branch invokes national security and expects due deference. In the
context of security clearances, Egan’s declaration of super-strong
deference to the executive in foreign affairs compelled lower courts to
deny plaintiffs a forum for bringing constitutional claims related to
racial discrimination in the security clearance process. This abdication
has reinforced, rather than checked, executive agency incompetence.
As a consequence, the judiciary has enabled a systematic denial of
clearances to candidates with foreign connections, depriving the
United States of the operational proficiency and the legitimacy to
wage a successful war on terror. This Note has presented a roadmap
for lower courts to change course by reopening judicial review of the
merits of security clearance determinations, making injured plaintiffs
whole, deterring future racial discrimination, and avoiding a chilling
effect on agency adjudicators.
In short, to reclaim its role in the United States’ system of
separation of powers, the judiciary should not use the Constitution to
make peace with the political branches of government, but rather,
should wield it as a sword.

251. See Dellinger, supra note 20, at 1534 (“[T]here is much to be said for a judicial
prerogative to fashion remedies that give flesh to the word and fulfillment to the promise those
norms embody.”).
252. See Peter Margulies, The Wages of Playing for Time: Avoidance Doctrines and
Interpretive Method in National Security and Foreign Relations Cases 8 (Roger Williams Univ.
Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 79, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465036 (listing
foreign affairs cases in which the Roberts Court has issued highly deferential rulings).

